(2025-12) Haïti : Deuxième Examen du Programme Surveillé par les Services du FMI et Demande de Prolongation — Communiqué de Presse et Rapport des Services

HAITI IMF Country Report No. 25/337 December 2025 SECOND REVIEW UNDER THE STAFF-MONITORED PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION—PRESS RELEASE AND STAFF REPORT In the context of the Second Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program and Request for Extension, the following documents have been released and are included in the package: • A Press Release. • The Staff Report prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board’s information following discussions that ended on October 8, with the officials of Haiti on economic developments and policies underpinning the Second Review Under the Staff-Monitored Program. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on December 1, 2025. • A Debt Sustainability Analysis prepared by the staffs of the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF’s transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities’ policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents. Copies of this report are available to the public from International Monetary Fund • Publication Services PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090 Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201 E-mail: publications@imf.org Web: http://www.imf.org International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C. © 2025 International Monetary Fund PR 25/398 IMF Management Approves the Second Review and Extends the Staff-Monitored Program with Haiti FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE A Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) is an informal agreement between an IMF member country and IMF staff to monitor the member country’s economic program. As such, SMPs do not entail endorsement by the IMF Executive Board. SMP staff reports are issued to the Board for information. • Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has approved the second review of the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) with Haiti, including the authorities’ request for a nine month extension of the SMP through September 19, 2026. • Program implementation has been encouraging despite the challenging environment. All quantitative and indicative targets were met at the end-June test date, with monetary financing kept at zero and reserves accumulation exceeding the program target. The reform implementation has continued, though with delays in some areas. • The SMP extension will allow the authorities to maintain policy continuity, consolidate recent progress, and complete and strengthen reforms, particularly in governance, anticorruption, revenue mobilization, and enhancing the social safety net. Washington, DC: Management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on November 25, 2025 the second review of Haiti’s Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), including the authorities’ request for a nine-month extension of the SMP through September 19, 2026. SMPs are informal agreements between country authorities and the IMF to monitor the implementation of the authorities’ economic program and build a track record of policy implementation that could pave the way for financial assistance from the IMF’s upper credit tranche (UCT). Haiti’s SMP is tailored to its context of acute security challenges, institutional fragility, and capacity constraints. It supports the authorities’ priorities of economic stabilization, improved governance, anticorruption, and strengthening the social safety net. Economic conditions in Haiti remain fragile amid persistent domestic and external shocks, and rising uncertainty. Against the backdrop of intensifying gang violence, Real GDP contracted in FY2025 for the seventh consecutive year, while annual inflation remained high at around 32 percent. The expiration of the TPS for Haitians in the United States in February 2026, the non-renewal of the HOPE/HELP preferential trade agreement which ended in September 2025, and the impact of Hurricane Melissa in late October 2025—which caused significant loss of life and widespread damage to infrastructure and agricultural areas, exacerbating humanitarian needs and further constraining resources— are expected to further strain the Haitian economy. Despite the challenging conditions, program implementation has been encouraging. All quantitative and indicative targets for the end-June test date were met. Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit has been maintained at zero, social spending reached the program’s targets, 2 and revenue performance stayed on track. International reserves continued to accumulate, supported by strong remittance inflows and foreign exchange purchases. Net international reserves reached almost US$ 1.5 billion by end July 2025. The reform agenda—covering governance, public financial management, safeguards, and data provision—continues to advance, although with delays in some areas. The authorities continue to demonstrate strong ownership and engagement, including through the high-level SMP Monitoring Committee. The nine-month extension of the SMP through September 2026 will help support macroeconomic stability, preserve reform momentum, and allow for political and security conditions to stabilize. The extension will consolidate recent achievements and advance key priorities, including strengthening governance and institutional safeguards, enhancing revenue mobilization, and improving the efficiency of public financial management. The additional time will also allow for a more thorough assessment of the impact of ongoing international initiatives, including the United Nations’ Gang Suppression Force and the Organization of American States’ ‘Haitian Led Road Roadmap for Recovery and Peace’. While security remains the top priority, the SMP will continue to focus on key policy areas and reforms critical to Haiti, mainly: Advancing governance reforms to overcome fragility. Reform efforts should be coordinated and anchored in the Governance Diagnostic Report, including (i) enhancing transparency and accountability in public financial management; (ii) mitigating corruption risks in revenue administration; and (iii) ensuring accountability for serious corruption, organized crime, and money laundering. The authorities are encouraged to complete the national assessment for money laundering and terrorist financing, and to continue addressing strategic deficiencies in Haiti’s anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework to support its exit from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. Mobilizing revenue and improving budget execution. Fiscal policy remains constrained by institutional weaknesses that hinder revenue mobilization and spending efficiency. Immediate priorities include operationalizing automated monthly data exchanges between the tax and customs systems and completing the rollout of tax declarations and payments services for all large taxpayers across all commercial banks. Strengthening budget execution—especially for social and security spending—is essential to adequately support vulnerable populations and advance critical infrastructure. This requires improved treasury cash management and robust project appraisal and budget prioritization, in line with the 2022 IMF Public Investment Management Assessment. Strengthening the central bank’s policy frameworks. Monetary policy credibility has improved with the elimination of monetary financing of the budget deficit. Given the challenging and uncertain environment, foreign exchange interventions should remain focused on supporting the accumulation of international reserves and preserving exchange rate stability. Advancing the financial system’s regulatory and supervisory reform is essential, particularly by enhancing both on-site and off-site supervision. Despite the authorities’ continued efforts, Haiti requires international financial support to address its significant development needs. To safeguard debt sustainability and build on progress under the SMP, this support should come as grants rather than non-concessional loans. Grant financing is essential to meet immediate humanitarian, social, and economic needs, and to place the economy on a steady and sustainable medium- and long-term growth path, which is essential for improving living conditions for the Haitian people. 3 In line with the Fund’s Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, IMF staff will maintain close collaboration with Haiti’s main development partners, particularly on governance and capacity development. HAITI STAFF REPORT FOR THE SECOND REVIEW UNDER THE December 1, 2025 STAFF-MONITORED PROGRAM AND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Haiti continues to face exceptional challenges amid a deteriorating security environment and institutional fragility. Gang violence has intensified, undermining state authority and disrupting economic activity. Uncertainty persists over the political transition and the feasibility of holding general elections in 2026. The United Nations Security Council’s authorization to deploy a new Gang Suppression Force and the establishment of a United Nations Support Office for Haiti mark a potential turning point for the country, though security gains will take time to materialize and will require international support. Economic conditions remain fragile and external pressures are rising. Real GDP is estimated to have contracted by 3.1 percent in FY2025 and projected to contract by 1.2 percent in FY2026. Inflation remains high, at 31.9 percent in FY2025. Recent external policy shifts—including the expiration of the Temporary Protected Status for Haitians living in the United States, the termination of textile and apparel trade preferences, and a new cash remittance tax—are expected to reduce foreign inflows and increase external and fiscal pressures. Economic conditions may be further strained by the impact of Hurricane Melissa in late October—which caused significant loss of life and widespread damage to infrastructure and agricultural areas, exacerbating humanitarian needs and is likely to further constrain resources. Program performance under the Staff-Monitored Program is progressing well. All end-June quantitative and indicative targets have been met. Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit has been maintained at zero, and international reserves continue to accumulate. The authorities remain strongly engaged through the high-level Staff Monitored Program Monitoring Committee. Moreover, the reform agenda has advanced, as reflected in the implementation of most structural benchmarks, despite delays in some areas. Staff recommended maintaining focus on the core priorities of the Staff Monitored Program. These include strengthening governance and anti-corruption efforts in line with the Governance Diagnostic Report, safeguarding adequate reserve coverage, improving public financial management—including revenue mobilization and HAITI expenditure efficiency—and, expanding targeted social assistance. To preserve macroeconomic stability, monetary financing of the deficit must remain at zero, and international reserves should be maintained at an adequate level while preserving the nominal anchor currently provided by the exchange rate. Domestic revenue mobilization efforts and governance reforms need to continue. The authorities requested a nine-month extension of the Staff-Monitored Program, which staff proposes for Management’s approval. The extension aims to support macroeconomic stability and preserve reform momentum, amid worsening security conditions and heightened political uncertainty. Staff hopes to see an improvement in the political and security conditions during this time. The extension will also allow for the completion of remaining structural benchmarks and will advance the governance and reform agenda through new structural benchmarks. Staff supports the request and proposes adjustments to the structural benchmarks accordingly to reinforce revenue collection, and enhance safeguards, accountability, and transparency. 2 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI Approved By Dora Iakova (WHD) and Jay Peiris (SPR) CONTENTS Policy discussions were conducted remotely during September 30-October 8, 2025. The team comprised Camilo E. Tovar (Head), Nathalie Pouokam, Gonzalo Huertas, and Maylin Sun (all WHD); Tatsuya Hasegawa (SPR); Abdoul Karim Sidibe (STA); Jinkyu Sung (FAD), and Gabriel Duvalsaint and Ralph Wata (Port-au-Prince office). Ben Aldersey (LEG) and Laurence Coste (LEG) provided support on governance and AML/CFT issues. Henrique Chociay (SPR) and Mher Barseghyan (STA) participated in earlier discussions and preparation for this mission. Ms. Toyosi Ojo provided research analysis, and Soungbe Coquillat and Brett Smith (all WHD) assisted with mission scheduling and the preparation of the report. Mr. André Roncaglia and Ms. Ludmilla Buteau Allien (both OEDBR) joined key policy discussions. CONTEXT_________________________________________________________________________________________7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS _______________________________________________________________________8 PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP ____________________________________________ 12 OUTLOOK AND RISKS _________________________________________________________________________ 13 POLICY DISCUSSIONS _________________________________________________________________________ 15 A. Fiscal Policy ___________________________________________________________________________________15 B. Enhancing Governance and Transparency _____________________________________________________20 C. Strengthening the Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy Framework___________________________22 D. Safeguarding Financial Sector Stability________________________________________________________23 E. Data Adequacy and Other Issues ______________________________________________________________23 PROGRAM ISSUES _____________________________________________________________________________ 24 STAFF APPRAISAL _____________________________________________________________________________ 25 FIGURES 1. Monitoring Economic Activity Through Satellite-Based Port Data ______________________________ 9 2. Revenue Performance, FY2021–25_____________________________________________________________16 3. Real Sector Developments, 2019–25 __________________________________________________________40 4. Fiscal Sector Developments, 2019–25 _________________________________________________________41 5. Monetary and Financial Sectors Developments, 2019–25______________________________________42 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 3 HAITI 6. External Sector Developments, 2019–25_______________________________________________________43 TABLES 1a. Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2024–September 2025 ______________________28 1b. Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2025–June 2026_____________________________29 2a. Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP _________________________________________________30 2b. Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP—Proposed with the Extension _________________31 2c. Schedule of Reviews__________________________________________________________________________31 3. Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2021–30 _________________________________________32 4a. Non-Financial Public Sector Operations, 2021–30 (In millions of US$) _______________________33 4b. Non-Financial Public Sector Operations, 2021–30 (In percent of GDP) _______________________34 5a. Balance of Payments, 2021–30 (In millions of US$) ___________________________________________35 5b. Balance of Payments, 2021–30 (In percent of GDP) __________________________________________36 6. Summary Accounts of the Banking System, 2021–30__________________________________________37 7. External Financing Requirements and Sources, 2021–30 ______________________________________38 8. Financial Soundness Indicators, September 2023 – June 2025_________________________________39 ANNEXES I. Spillover Impact to Haiti from External Policy Shifts____________________________________________44 II. External Sector Assessment ___________________________________________________________________46 III. Adverse Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis of Global Developments ___________________________51 IV. Risk Assessment Matrix_______________________________________________________________________53 V. Boosting Revenues ____________________________________________________________________________55 APPENDIXES I. Letter of Intent _________________________________________________________________________________57 Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies ______________________________60 Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding ____________________________________72 4 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI Glossary AGD General Administration of Customs AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism BINUH United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti BOP Balance of Payments BRH Bank of the Republic of Haiti CA Current Account CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio CCRIF Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility CERC Contingency Emergency Response Component CNMP National Commission for Public Procurement CSCCA Council of the Superior Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes DGB General Directorate of the Budget DGI Directorate of General Taxes DNFBP Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions DPC Civil Pension Directorate ECF Extended Credit Facility ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance EU European Union FAES Economic and Social Assistance Fund FATF Financial Action Task Force FDI Foreign Direct Investment FSW Food Shock Window FX Foreign Exchange GDR IMF Governance Diagnostic Report GDP Gross Domestic Product GIR Gross International Reserves GSF Gang Suppressing Force HELP Haiti Economic Lift Program Act HOPE Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership and Encouragement Act IADB Inter-American Development Bank IHSI Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 HAITI IT Indicative Target IRFCL International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity MCP Multiple Currency Practice MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance MSS Multinational Support Mission NFA Net Foreign Assets NFPS Nonfinancial Public Sector NIIP Net International Investment Position NIR Net International Reserves NPL Nonperforming Loan NAR National Risk Assessment OAS Organization of American States PIMA Public Investment Management Assessment PNPPS National Social Protection and Promotion Policy QT Quantitative Target REER Real Effective Exchange Rate RMS Revenue Management System SB Structural Benchmark SDR Special Drawing Right SIMAST Information System of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor SMP Staff-Monitored Program SYDONIA Customs Automation System TA Technical Assistance TMU Technical Memorandum of Understanding TPC Transitional Presidential Council TPS Temporary Protected Status TSA Treasury Single Account UCREF Central Financial Intelligence Unit UCT Upper Credit Tranche UN United Nations UNSOH UN Support Office in Haiti US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank 6 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI CONTEXT 1. Haiti continues to confront an acute security and humanitarian crisis. Gang violence has intensified, with murder rates at record highs this year.1 More than 1.4 million people were internally displaced as of September 2025—over three times as many as in December 2023—with hundreds of thousands more displaced abroad. Half the population (5.7 million) faces hunger. Gangs continue to undermine state authority, block roads, impose illicit tolls, and disrupt economic activity. International flights remain suspended in Port-au-Prince, and several ports face closures or restricted access.2 Social unrest has escalated, with repeated attacks on the Péligre hydroelectric plant, causing major disruptions to the supply of electricity in the capital. In early August, upon taking office, the new head of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), Mr. Laurent Saint-Cyr, declared a three month state of emergency in the central region to fight surging gang violence. 2. Coordinated international action remains essential to address the multidimensional crisis. In July this year, the United Nations (UN) Security Council extended the mandate of the UN Integrated Office (BINUH) until January 2026. In September, the UN Security Council issued a resolution authorizing the deployment of a new Gang Suppression Force (GSF)—for an initial period of 12 months and a force of up to 5,550 members—to replace the under-resourced Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission, effective October 2. In addition, the resolution authorizes the establishment of a Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to assist the GSF, the BINUH, and the Haitian Police and Armed Forces. These initiatives complement other international initiatives to align efforts to address the multidimensional crisis in Haiti, among them is the Organization of American States (OAS) Haitian-led Roadmap for Stability and Peace to support long-term recovery and stability,3 and the United States (US) designation of the Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif gangs as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists—aiming to cut off their access to the US financial system. 3. The implementation of Haiti’s April 2024 political transitional map—security, constitutional and institutional reform, and elections—remains uncertain. Persistent insecurity and logistical challenges undermine prospects for holding general elections—the first since 2016— and installing a new government before the TPC’s mandate expires on February 7, 2026. With plans for a new constitution abandoned in early October 2025, elections are now expected to be held under the 1987 constitution, with the first round scheduled for late August 2026, and the second round in early December 2026, if security conditions are adequate. 1 Haiti reported 4,864 murders between October 2024 and June 2025. See BINUH and UN Human Rights report. 2 The Port of Saint-Louis du Sud opened in January 2025 may help reroute essential imports (e.g., rice and cement). 3 The OAS plan is structured around five pillars and estimated cost of $2.6 billion: security stabilization and peace restoration ($1.3 billion), political consensus and governance support ($5.1 million), electoral process and institutional legitimacy ($104.1 million), humanitarian response ($908.2 million), and sustainable development and economic development ($256.1 million). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 7 HAITI 4. Economic conditions remain fragile amid persistent shocks and rising uncertainty. Haiti experienced its seventh consecutive year of economic contraction amid high inflation. Recent US policy changes—including the expiration of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians, the termination of textile and apparel trade preferences under the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership and Encouragement and Haiti Economic Lift Program (HOPE/HELP) acts, a new tax on cash remittances, and the reevaluation and realignment of foreign assistance, including from the US Agency for International Development—USAID (Annex I)—are expected to reduce remittances and exports. These developments—together with the 207,000 deportations of Haitians from the Dominican Republic since January 2025—are likely to compound the impact of the security crisis on domestic production, deepen the humanitarian and economic crisis, and increase fiscal pressures. The recent Hurricane Melissa which caused significant losses of lives and extensive damages to property and infrastructure, particularly in the Southern departments, could further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and place additional strain on already limited resources. Against this backdrop, maintaining progress under the Staff Monitored Program (SMP) may prove challenging, despite the authorities’ strong commitment. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5. Economic activity remains weak, Inflation (In percent, year-on-year) reflecting dire security conditions (Figure 1). The index of economic activity contracted by 2.4 percent over the first three quarters of FY2025 (October to June),4 and real GDP is estimated to have declined by 3.1 percent for the full fiscal year—down from a 1.0 percent contraction projected in the 1st Review. Output has been 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Overall Food adversely affected by persistent gang violence, roadblocks, and repeated attacks on the Péligre hydroelectric plant in Mirebalais—a vital electricity source for the country—alongside damage to transmission lines. Inflation reached 31.9 percent in FY2025, driven by supply-side pressures. 6. The banking sector remains vulnerable amid rising security risks. Banks have continued to reduce lending to the private sector, reflecting limited investment opportunities and challenges in collateral assessment due to the security crisis. Bank credit is estimated to have reached 3.1 percent of GDP in FY2025, down from 3.8 percent 4 The fiscal year (FY) runs from October 1 to September 30. Sep-19 Jun-20 Mar-21 Dec-21 Sep-22 Jun-23 Mar-24 Dec-24 Sep-25 Republic of Haiti. Sources: Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics (IHSI), and Bank of the Credit to GDP Gap 10 (In percent) 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 2017Q2 2018Q2 2019Q2 2020Q2 2021Q2 2022Q2 2023Q2 2024Q2 2025Q2 Note: Credit-to-GDP deviation from trend, estimated with a one-sided HP filter. Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti and IMF staff calculations. 8 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI of GDP in FY2024. The credit-to-GDP gap reached -11 percent in June 2025. The commercial banking system continues to show signs of weakness, as nonperforming loans (NPLs) reached 14.2 percent in June 2025—from 13.7 percent in March. Provisions to gross NPLs also fell from 81.5 percent in December 2024 to 66.0 percent in June 2025. Return on assets has been stable but low, at 1.5 percent as of June 2025. Nonetheless, the system’s capital adequacy ratio stood at 22.3 percent, well above the regulatory minimum of 12 percent, though with some variability across financial institutions. Figure 1. Haiti: Monitoring Economic Activity Through Satellite-Based Port Data Average daily ship arrivals and import volumes have declined in recent months, following a modest recovery since mid-2024. Total trade activity remains below pre-pandemic levels. Export volumes remain particularly weak, reflecting ongoing security conditions. Daily Ship Arrivals 2.0 1.0 (Average monthly number) Cargo ships Tanker ships (rhs) 1.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 Jun-20 Mar-21 Dec-21 Sep-22 Jun-23 Mar-24 Dec-24 Sep-25 Daily Import and Export Volumes 10 1.2 (In metric tons) Imports Exports (rhs) 1.0 8 0.8 6 0.6 4 0.4 2 0.2 0 0.0 Jun-20 Mar-21 Dec-21 Sep-22 Jun-23 Mar-24 Dec-24 Sep-25 Cargo and tanker ship arrivals have shown a modest increase compared to 2024, but overall arrivals remain subdued. September, 2024 September 2025 Arrival of Ships, January - 7 Cargo Tanker (Number of ships) 7-day Moving Average Prior Year: 7-day Moving Average 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-24 May-24 Jun-24 Jul-24 Aug-24 Sep-24 Sources: IMF portwatch data; Port-au-Prince port. Arrival of Ships, January - 7 Cargo Tanker (Number of ships) 7-day Moving Average Prior Year: 7-day Moving Average 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Jan-25 Feb-25 Mar-25 Apr-25 May-25 Jun-25 Jul-25 Aug-25 Sep-25 7. On September 23, the Government adopted a second supplementary budget for FY2025, aimed at supporting school reopening and protecting vulnerable households. The overall spending envelope was set at 317.7 billion gourdes—1.8 percent lower than the April supplementary budget—reflecting revenue shortfalls and weak budget execution. At the same time, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 9 HAITI about 3.8 billion gourdes were reallocated to social Haiti: FY2025 Budget Allocation — Initial and Supplementary Budgets (In percent of total budget) Sector Initial Supplementary Budget Difference spending—including cash transfers to Budget Apr. 2025 Sep. 2025 (Apr. vs Sep.) approximately 200,000 parents, improvements in school infrastructure, and the distribution of school kits to children from vulnerable families.5 8. In FY2025, the fiscal position was balanced, reflecting both low revenue collection and low spending execution.6 Revenues (Indicative Target, IT) rose by 12.8 percent, despite a three-month strike at the Directorate of General Taxes (DGI). However, the revenue-to-GDP ratio declined to 4.7 percent—0.6 percentage points below FY2024. Nominal expenditure increased by Economic Affairs 28.0 25.3 23.9 -1.4 Politics 21.6 23.1 24.0 0.9 Security 1/ 13.9 15.1 15.5 0.4 Social Services 25.8 27.8 29.4 1.6 Culture 1.2 1.1 1.1 0.0 Other Administration 19.6 18.6 17.5 -1.1 Judicial and Legislative 2.1 2.4 2.3 0.0 Independent Organizations 2/ 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and IMF staff estimates. 1/ Budget allocation for the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice. 2/ Budget allocation for Superior Court of Auditors and Litigation, Electoral Council, State University of Haiti, and Academy of Haitian Creole. Fiscal Revenues and Expenditures (Percentage change, year-on-year) 39.6 percent. However, the execution of spending remained weak and concentrated towards the end of the fiscal year, reaching 72.1 percent of the total supplementary budget—with capital execution particularly low at 37.5 percent, due to inadequate project appraisal and limited administrative capacity.7 Social spending (quantitative target, QT) 200 160 120 80 40 0 -40 Revenue Expenditure Dec-24 Jan-25 Feb-25 Mar-25 Apr-25 May-25 Jun-25 Jul-25 Aug-25 Sep-25 rose 41.4 percent. Of the USD 105 million (15.6 billion gourdes) received under the 2023 IMF’s Food Shock Window (FSW), about 91 percent (14.1 billion gourdes) had been executed by September, Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance, and IMF staff estimates. Fiscal Revenues and Expenditures (In millions of gourdes) with the remainder (about 1.45 billion gourdes) carried over into the FY2026 budget.8 Monetary financing (QT) remained at zero in FY2025, down from an average of 2 percent of GDP during FY2020-23. Public debt is estimated at 11.7 percent of GDP at end-FY2025, the lowest in the Latin America and Caribbean region. 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 Revenue Expenditure Dec-24 Jan-25 Feb-25 Mar-25 Apr-25 May-25 Jun-25 Jul-25 Aug-25 Sep-25 Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance, and IMF staff estimates. 5In September 2025, 0.5 billion gourdes were executed for the distribution of textbooks to students, and 0.3 billion gourdes for school infrastructure improvement. In addition, Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor executed 3.4 billion gourdes to strengthen support for vulnerable groups, including cash transfers, food kits, hot meals, and water containers. 6 Based on FY2025 fiscal data provided by the authorities on October 17, 2025. 7 Expenditures amounted to 44.1 billion gourdes in September 2025, due to a temporary spike in cash payments and commitments during the final month of the FY. 8 Preliminary September FSW execution, based on available data. 10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI 9. The external position has improved, supported by strong remittances. The current account (CA) recorded a moderate surplus in FY2025, following a deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in FY2024. This reflected a sharp increase in net remittances—up about 24 percent (October August) relative to the same period in FY2024— driven by the need to support relatives amid deteriorating security and economic conditions and, possibly, in anticipation of changes in U.S. migration policy. Higher remittances supported a recovery in imports from mid-2024 through mid Net Remittances (In millions of US dollars) 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Dec-22 Apr-23 Aug-23 Dec-23 Apr-24 Aug-24 Dec-24 Apr-25 Aug-25 Sources: Bank of the Repunblic of Haiti. 2025, as confirmed by satellite data (Figure 1), and helped offset falling exports—due to domestic production constraints—and a widening trade deficit. Haiti: Exports, Imports, and Remittances 1/Millions of US dollars In percent of GDP Percentage change 3/ Text Table 1. Haiti: Exports, Imports, and Remittances 1/ FY20-24 2/ FY24 FY25 FY20-24 2/ FY24 FY25 FY25 vs. FY20-24 2/ FY25 vs FY24 A. Cumulative Exports October-June 731 574 520 3.6 2.3 1.6 -28.9 -9.4 Imports October-July 3,618 3,553 3,858 18.0 14.1 11.9 6.6 8.6 Net Remittances October-August 2,859 3,065 3,786 14.3 12.1 11.7 32.4 23.5 B. Latest Available Exports June 82 73 61 … … … -25.8 -16.5 Imports July 369 387 377 … … … 2.2 -2.7 Net Remittances August 272 287 346 … … … 27.3 20.5 Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti and IMF staff estimates. 1/ Net remittances. 2/ Average over the period. 3/ Calculations done using annual GDP data. FY2025 GDP is based on staff projections. 10. International reserve accumulation was strong during FY2025. The Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) continued to purchase foreign exchange (FX), resulting in a NIR accumulation (QT) of US$567 million by end-June—well above the QT target of US$100 million. Gross international reserves remained adequate, exceeding US$3.1 billion (over 7 months of prospective imports) as of end-July. Despite the substantial FX purchases, the nominal exchange rate remained stable at around 130 gourdes per dollar throughout the FY—supported by sustained FX inflows from remittances— providing a nominal anchor for the economy. The real exchange rate is estimated to have appreciated over 30 percent during FY2025. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 11 HAITI (In millions of US dollars, unless otherwise noted)Mar 2024 Jun 2024 Sep 2024 Dec 2024 Mar 2025 Jun 2025 Jul 2025A. Gross International Reserves 2,425.3 2,447.3 2,522.2 2,718.6 2,924.5 3,105.1 3,120.4Monetary gold 128.9 135.7 153.1 151.9 181.3 191.4 192.0 Text Table 2. Haiti: Net International Reserves - 2024 SMP Definition Holdings of foreign currency 27.4 44.5 37.4 34.4 55.6 53.9 80.4 Demand deposits abroad 475.2 470.9 443.7 694.2 681.9 781.4 766.0 Investments abroad 1/ 1,665.3 1,675.9 1,765.9 1,723.4 1,892.7 1,972.2 1,975.6 SDR holdings 2/ 101.2 93.3 94.2 86.9 85.2 78.5 78.5 Reserve Position in the Fund 2/ 27.2 27.0 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 B. Reserve Related Liabilities 488.4 453.3 306.9 242.4 241.7 235.9 235.2 Liabilities to the IMF 2/ 3/ 244.7 237.7 245.1 239.8 239.8 234.7 234.7 Short-term loans from private non-residents 4/ 242.9 213.4 60.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Liabilities to IFIs 0.5 2.0 1.3 2.4 1.7 1.0 0.3 Certified checks in FX 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 C. FX Denominated Liabilities to Residents 1,296.6 1,327.0 1,263.7 1,286.9 1,353.5 1,364.7 1,362.4 Financial sector FX deposits in the central bank 1,263.7 1,294.5 1,231.0 1,254.2 1,320.8 1,333.0 1,331.3 Government FX deposit in transitory account (Venezuela debt) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Swaps with financial institutions 32.9 32.4 32.7 32.7 32.7 31.7 31.2 D. Other FX Liabilities 17.8 18.1 35.2 33.9 34.0 21.6 38.4 Off-balance sheet FX liabilities 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 Project accounts 2.7 3.0 20.2 18.8 19.0 6.5 23.3 Special accounts 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 E. Net International Reserves, 2024 SMP definition (A - B - C - D) 622.5 648.9 916.3 1,155.5 1,295.2 1,483.0 1,484.4 Sources: Bank of the Republic of Haiti, International Financial Statistics, and Fund staff calculations. 1/ Following IMF technical assistance in July 2025, some assets were reclassified in line with international best practices. 2/ Based on IMF books. For the purposes of the 2024 SMP, between September 2024 and September 2026, the amounts in SDR will be converted to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate as of September 30, 2024 (1 USD = 0.737261 SDR). 3/ For program purposes, all outstanding Haiti liabilities to the IMF are considered, including the January 2023 Rapid Credit Facility (Food Shock Window), disbursed at a 4/ This refers to a credit line used to facilitate the payment of the Venezuela debt operation in January 2024. government account in the BRH, for an amount of SDR 81.9 million. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE SMP 11. The authorities are strongly committed to the SMP, and performance since the 1st Review has been encouraging, despite the challenging domestic environment. • Quantitative and Indicative Targets. The BRH has exceeded the end-June target for NIRs (QT), supported by strong remittances (Table 1a). All June QT/ITs on the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) primary balance, social spending, and central government fiscal revenue were met. The June ceiling on net central bank credit to the public sector (QT) was also met, keeping monetary financing at zero. The authorities confirmed that no domestic or external arrears had been accumulated and that there are no plans to contract non-concessional loans (QT). • Structural Benchmarks. Progress on advancing reforms on governance, data provision and transparency has been steady, with six of the eleven structural benchmarks (SBs) being met (Table 2a). Reflecting the authority’s commitment to the implementation of the reform agenda, two additional SBs (SB4 and SB9) have been delivered albeit with some delay. Specifically: o The Governance Diagnostic Report was published in February 2025 (SB1, met). 12 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI o Procurement contracts continue to be published on the websites of the National Commission for Public Procurement (CNMP) and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), reflecting the government's commitment to transparency, but their publication has experienced some delays (SB2—continuous SB, not met). o Food Shock Window (FSW) monthly execution reports (SB3, met) are regularly published on the websites of the MEF and the General Directorate of the Budget (DGB). The quarterly internal expenditure audits have generally been provided on time, although capacity constraints caused the end-September audit to be delayed by two weeks (SB4—continuous SB, not met but implemented with delay). o The Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes (CSCCA) has conducted and published the financial and operational compliance audit of FSW spending for FY2022-23, and is in the process of finalizing it for FY2023-24. However, the March 2025 target for this audit was missed (SB5—end-March target, not met). o Quarterly reports on the operations and financial status of the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES) are being published on the MEF’s website (SB6—continuous SB, met). o The administrative and technical cooperation protocol between the Directorate of General Taxes (DGI) and General Administration of Customs (AGD) for the interconnection of their IT systems was signed and published in June (SB7, met). However, the digitalization of tax declaration and payments through all commercial banks for the large taxpayers registered at the DGI remains to be completed due to technical challenges (SB8—end-September 2025 target, not met). o The BRH audit report and audited financial statements for FY2023 were completed and published but with some delay relative to the original target date (SB9—end-August 2025 target, not met but implemented with delay). o The Board of Directors of the BRH has approved a new reserve management framework with a new strategic asset allocation, updated investment policy and guidelines, and a medium term plan for improving the composition of the investment portfolio (SB10—end September 2025 target, met). o The BRH has consistently provided its full balance sheet to IMF staff on time, using the standardized reporting form (SB11—continuous SB, met). OUTLOOK AND RISKS 12. Economic activity is expected to remain subdued in FY2026 and to gradually recover over the medium term, contingent on improving security. Real GDP is projected to decline by 1.2 percent in FY2026—down from the 1.0 percent increase expected in the 1st Review—and is likely to INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 13 HAITI be further affected by the damages and losses inflicted by Hurricane Melissa.9 Economic activity will be affected by the non-renewal of the HOPE/HELP act, which expired in September 2025. This will remove preferential trade access for Haitian textile and apparel exports to the US.10 Conditional on steady security improvements in security conditions, economic activity is expected to grow by 0.5 percent in FY2027, and to gradually converge to 1.5 percent over the medium term. Inflation is projected to reach single digits by FY2029 as supply shocks ease, provided macroeconomic policies remain sound and credible. 13. Fiscal policy remains constrained by security challenges, institutional weaknesses, and limited fiscal space. Domestic revenue (excluding grants) is expected to reach 4.7 percent of GDP in FY2026, and to gradually rise to 6.0 percent by FY2030, following the implementation of reforms enhancing revenue collection (¶19). Total expenditure is projected to increase from 5.5 percent to 7.6 percent of GDP over the same period, reflecting higher social and infrastructure spending. As a result, the deficit is expected to widen from 0.2 percent of GDP in FY2026 to 1.5 percent in FY2030. Public debt, while currently low and sustainable, is projected to remain at about 11 percent of GDP over the medium term. Nevertheless, the risk of debt distress remains high, reflecting the sustained weakening of Haiti’s production and export base due to the protracted security crisis (see 2025 Debt Sustainability Analysis).11 14. Staff assesses Haiti’s external position in FY2024 as broadly in line with the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies (Annex II). The CA gap is estimated at -0.9 percent of GDP. Over the medium term, the CA is projected to stabilize at around -2.0 percent of GDP. Remittances are projected to decline by about 3 percent of GDP in FY2026—down from 12.8 percent of GDP in FY2025—due to the termination of the TPS program in February 2026, and the introduction of a one-percent tax on certain types of cash remittances (Annex I). Remittances are projected to fall to 7 percent of GDP over FY2027-30. International reserve coverage is expected to remain adequate (at about 8 months of prospective imports by 2030). 15. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. These include a rise in gang-related disruptions, escalation of violence and social unrest, all of which could deepen social and economic vulnerabilities. Also, further tightening of US trade and migration policies, reduced external financing, and political instability could undermine economic activity and the external and fiscal positions. On the upside, the UN Security Council’s authorization to transition the Multinational Security Support mission in Haiti for a new multinational Gang Suppression Force—supported by the newly established UN Support Office for Haiti and the Organization of American States—could mark a 9 Preliminary staff estimates as of end-October suggest that the disaster could potentially reduce real GDP growth in FY2026 by around 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points. 10 Haiti’s textile and apparel exports to the U.S. account for about 77 percent of total goods exports and generates over 27,000 formal jobs. 11 Preliminary assessments of the impact of Hurricane Melissa indicate that the fiscal response could further heighten liquidity risks, underscoring the need to sustain efforts to improve donor aid coordination, as well as to enhance revenue collection and cash flow management. The portion of the 2023 IMF Food Shock Window’s funds carried over into the FY2026 budget (1.45 billion gourdes) could be used to address food insecurity in the aftermath of the hurricane. 14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAITI turning point in efforts to restore security in the country, rebuild institutions, and lay the foundations for economic growth and improved prospects for the Haitian people. A more rapid normalization of security conditions—if supported by sound policies and external financing—and a renewal of the HOPE/HELP Act could improve the outlook.12 16. Materialization of the downside risks could have long-lasting macroeconomic effects. Further deterioration of security and humanitarian conditions could severely deepen economic and social disruptions. Materialization of external risks, such as a decline in remittances, exports, and external grants, could increase the current account deficit by 1.4 percentage points, and lower real GDP growth by 0.9 percentage points in FY2026, relative to the baseline. This scenario would generate additional external financing needs of about $568 million, equivalent to 1.4 percent of GDP (Annex IV)—38 percent of NIRs.13 POLICY DISCUSSIONS Discussions focused on implementation of the SMP, particularly, boosting revenue mobilization to meet targets and expanding support to vulnerable households; maintaining zero monetary financing of government spending; accumulating NIR; strengthening governance; and sustaining the reform agenda. A. Fiscal Policy 17. The SMP aims to strengthen the fiscal framework through domestic revenue mobilization and better-quality spending. These objectives are critical for maintaining stability amid security challenges. The balanced fiscal position in FY2025 reflects mostly under-execution of spending.14 While nominal revenues increased in line with the program objectives, the ratio of revenues to GDP has continued to decline, underscoring the urgent need for sustained efforts to safeguard and boost revenue performance (Figure 2). Weak budget execution limits the impact of these gains, making it urgent to improve execution, particularly in sectors critical for recovery and social development. At the same time, it is important to ensure high-quality investment spending (e.g., schools, health, infrastructure) that supports employment and growth. 18. The FY2026 budget is broadly consistent with the SMP objectives. It maintains zero monetary financing of the deficit, strengthens domestic revenue mobilization, and safeguards critical social spending.15 The global envelope at 345.5 billion gourdes—a 8.8 percent increase compared to 12 For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) is working on a Medium-Term Recovery and Development Plan 2025-2030, with three pillars (i) economic development and the role of the private sector; (ii) basic services and human development; and (iii) institutional development. 13 If this scenario materializes, additional financing may be needed to supplement a drawdown of reserves. 14 A sustainable tax level for Haiti is at least 10 percent of GDP, with international benchmarks suggesting 12.5 percent of GDP is needed for basic state capacity. See Annex VI in Haiti’s 2024 Article IV, IMF Country Report No. 2024/333. 15 The FY2026 budget was adopted on October 10, 2025. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 15 HAITI the second supplementary budget—aims to address the security crisis, support the political transition, and promote economic recovery. Domestic revenues are projected at 250.4 billion gourdes (4.7 percent of GDP), supported by measures to strengthen the digitalization of tax and customs administrations and to enhance the capacity to conduct risk assessments of large taxpayers, as well as the implementation of the AGD reform (¶19). Public expenditures are projected at 328.5 billion gourdes (6.2 percent of GDP), with allocations for security, elections, industrial support, and assistance to vulnerable Haitians. In particular, capital expenditures are projected at 115.0 billion gourdes (2.2 percent of GDP), with a focus on improving execution rates. The authorities’ budget projects an overall fiscal balance at -0.3 percent of GDP in FY2026. Figure 2. Haiti: Revenue Performance, FY2021–25 Total Tax Revenue Total Tax Revenue (Real index September 2021 = 100, cumulative values) (Year-on-year percentage nominal change) 200 120 2021 2024 2022 150 100 2025 2023 2024 80 100 2025 60 50 40 0 20 -50 0 -100 Oct NovDec Jan Feb Mar AprMay Jun Jul AugSep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Total Domestic Taxes Customs Duties (Real index September 2021 = 100, cumulative values) 120 180 2021 (Real index September 2021 = 100, cumulative values) 2021 160 2022 2022 100 2023 140 2023 2024 80 120 2024 2025 2025 100 60 80 40 60 40 20 20 0 0 Oct NovDec Jan Feb Mar AprMay Jun Jul AugSep Oct NovDec Jan Feb Mar AprMay Jun Jul AugSep Sources: Ministry of Economy and Finance and IMF staff calculations. 19. Strengthening domestic revenue mobilization remains a priority. The implementation of the new tax code has been postponed to October 2026 to complete key administrative and legal tasks and to ensure adequate engagement with the private sector. Meanwhile, the authorities are advancing high-impact measures to boost revenue collection, particularly through the digitalization of tax and customs administration. The digitalization of tax declarations and payments through commercial banks for all large tax