(2024-07) Rapò Trimèstryèl Konsèy Sekirite UNODC a, jiyè 2024
Rezime — Lèt sa a soti nan Sekretè Jeneral Nasyonzini bay Konsèy Sekirite a, li transmèt katriyèm rapò trimès UNODC (Biwo Nasyonzini sou dwòg ak krim) dapre rezolisyon 2692 (2023). Rapò a gen enfòmasyon ajou sou trafik zam, sikilasyon lajan ilegal, ak aktivite Nasyonzini ki enpòtan nan peyi Ayiti.
Dekouve Enpotan
- Gang ayisyen yo ap vin pi otonòm de moun politik ak ekonomik ki sipòte yo, krim transnasyonal ak enstabilite politik ap ba yo plis pouvwa.
- Zam afe ap fè trafik antre Ayiti atravè twa gwo wout: wout nò a soti Etazini, wout sid la soti Karayib ak Amerik di Sid, ak wout lès la soti Repiblik Dominikèn.
- Gen plis konsyans sou dinamik trafik zam afe soti Etazini pou ale Ayiti, men sipèvizyon limite sou lojistik anbakman rete yon gwo obstak.
- Enstabilite politik ak ekonomik Ayiti agrave pa koripsyon sistemik ak blanchiman lajan, lwa ki fèt pou anpeche aktivite sa yo aplike sèlman an pati epi mal aplike.
- Entèseksyon gang domestik yo ak rezo kriminèl òganize transnasyonal yo reprezante yon menas pou estabilite nan Ayiti ak nan rejyon an pi laj.
Deskripsyon Konple
Rapò a, ki soumèt dapre rezolisyon 2692 (2023) Konsèy Sekirite a, bay detay sou sous ak wout zam ilegal ak sikilasyon lajan ilegal nan Ayiti, ansanm ak aktivite ak rekòmandasyon Nasyonzini ki enpòtan yo. Li kouvri peryòd 19 Avril rive 12 Jiyè 2024, yon moman enstabilite ki make pa konsolidasyon gang yo ak fòmasyon yon konsèy prezidansyèl tranzisyon. Rapò a bati sou rapò UNODC anvan yo, li bay plis eksplikasyon sou dimansyon rejyonal, nasyonal, ak sou-nasyonal trafik zam afe, minisyon, ak sikilasyon lajan ilegal. Li adrese tou enplikasyon transnasyonal enstabilite nan Ayiti, tankou trafik rejyonal dwòg, trafik moun, ak kontrebann migran, ansanm ak evolisyon rezo kriminèl Ayiti yo ak patisipasyon yo nan devlopman politik ak krim òganize.
Teks Konple Dokiman an
Teks ki soti nan dokiman orijinal la pou endeksasyon.
United Nations S/2024/554
Security Council
Distr.: General
16 July 2024
Original: English
24-13054 (E) 050824
*2413054*
Letter dated 15 July 2024 from the Secretary-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2692 (2023), I have the honour to transmit
to the Security Council the fourth quarterly report of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime. The report includes the requested updated information on the
sources and routes of arms trafficking and illicit financial flows and on relevant
United Nations activities and recommendations.
I should be grateful if you would have the present document brought to the
attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the
Council.
(Signed) António Guterres
S/2024/554
24-13054 2/25
Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant
to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council
resolution 2692 (2023), in which the Security Council tasked the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) with reporting to the Council every three
months, concurrently with the reporting cycle of the United Nations Integrated Office
in Haiti (BINUH), through the Secretary-General, on sources and routes of illicit arms
and financial flows and on relevant United Nations activities and recommendations.
The report covers the period from 19 April to 12 July 2024, which was a time of
instability in Haiti, including the consolidation of powerful gangs and the formation
of a transitional presidential council. It was prepared in advance of the deployment
of the Multinational Security Support Mission.
2. The first report of UNODC (S/2023/780) provided an overview of trafficking in
firearms and ammunition in Haiti, detailing key sources, methods and routes from the
north and east of the country, and drawing insights from the UNODC briefing note
entitled “Haiti’s criminal markets: mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking”,
issued in March 2023. The report documented a surge in trafficking of sophisticated
weapons from 2021 to 2023, mostly linked to criminal gangs, with firearms primarily
shipped from the United States of America, sometimes arriving through the
Dominican Republic. The second report (S/2024/79) explored the regional dynamics
of firearms trafficking, highlighting source and transit countries, such as the United
States, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, and the domestic dynamics, particularly
the role of gangs in Port-au-Prince in procuring and distributing weapons. It was noted
in the report that a few of the gangs were particularly adept at stockpiling and
redistributing firearms and outlined efforts by anti-corruption agencies to disrupt
arms purchases. The third report (S/2024/320) described escalating gang violence in
Haiti’s capital between January and March 2024, emphasizing the deteriorating
security situation, the vulnerability of southern Haiti to trafficking and the link
between destabilization and increased migration flows in the Caribbean. The need to
strengthen border controls to prevent access to firearms was stressed and details were
provided concerning how gangs were consolidating control over strategic areas in
Port-au-Prince and in coastal regions.
3. The present report contains further explanations of the regional, national and
subnational dimensions of trafficking in firearms and ammunition and illicit financial
flows. The transnational implications of persistent instability in Haiti are described,
including in relation to regional trafficking in drugs, human trafficking and migrant
smuggling. In addition, the report covers the evolution of Haiti’s criminal networks,
including non-State actors, and their involvement in both political developments and
organized crime. The preparation of the report during a period of intense volatility in
Haiti underlines the importance of routine monitoring and surveillance of patterns of
organized criminality in the country and wider region.
Background
4. During the reporting period, several Haitian gangs expanded their influence and
capabilities in advance of the deployment of the Multinational Security Support
Mission. Armed with automatic and semi-automatic rifles and handguns, the gangs
S/2024/554
3/25 24-13054
are increasingly autonomous from their political and economic backers.
1
Empowered
by proceeds from transnational crime and emboldened by political instability, some
have become more public, amplifying their voice in the media. In the process, several
gangs are positioning themselves as strategic political players.
Figure I
Gang controlled areas of Port-au-Prince as of June 2024
2
__________________
1
According to the United Nations human rights expert in Haiti, gangs continue to profit from
extortion, kidnapping and payouts from politicians and elites, but over the past few years they
have become much more autonomous and no longer need the financial support of the old guard
(see Maria Abi-Habib, “Haiti’s gangs grow stronger as Kenyan-led force prepares to deploy”,
The New York Times, 21 May 2024).
2
See S/2023/674 and S/2024/320. See also Global Initiative on Transnational Organized Crime,
“A critical moment: Haiti’s gang crisis and international responses”, February 2024.
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Figure II
Gang controlled areas of downtown Port-au-Prince as of June 2024
5. Although rival gangs continue to compete violently among themselves, there
also continues to be evidence of increased collusion and cooperation. In September
2023, Haitian gangs entered into informal truces and worked closely together.
3
An
example is the so-called “Viv Ansanm” (“Live Together”) alliance. While the
temporary alliance stumbled due to infighting in late 2023, it was restored in February
2024 (see S/2024/320) after gangs publicly pledged to overthrow the former Prime
Minister and amid calls to forcefully resist the Multinational Security Support
Mission.
6. The Viv Ansanm alliance has helped gangs to consolidate their influence in Port-
au-Prince. According to key informants of UNODC, some gangs periodically share
profits from the extortion of domestic private sector actors in a shared fund. Proceeds
are also used to illegally acquire firearms and ammunition.
4
Several gangs launched
a coordinated attack against the international airport, government facilities, police
__________________
3
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and BINUH,
“Human rights situation: main trends, quarterly report: July-September 2023”, in which it was
noted that between July and September 2023, several gang members announced truces.
4
Information provided by the Department of Safety and Security, 5 June 2024.
S/2024/554
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stations and the national prison. Among the 4,600 inmates who escaped were
individuals with connections to transnational organized criminal networks.
7. The escape of high-level gang members generated destabilizing effects in Haiti.
An example of this is the leader of the Baz Pilate gang, who had been convicted of
murder, illegal possession of firearms, rape and armed robbery in June 2022. Aligned
with the G9 gang, Baz Pilate is described as one of Haiti’s most feared gangs with
expertise in drug trafficking, racketeering and assassinations.
8. Other experienced criminal escapees could prove to be a destabilizing force.
One of them, the former head of security for the late President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse,
was allegedly driven to Village de Dieu and reportedly collaborated with the 5 Segond
gang in importing illicit firearms, ammunition and, potentially, drugs.
5
He was also a
principal suspect in a significant case pursued by the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration in 2015 and the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the Directorate
of Judicial Police on charges of illegal drug trafficking and kidnapping.
6
In the same
way as for the aforementioned head of Baz Pilate, this escapee worked alongside the
5 Segond gang and has reportedly been involved in illicit activities.
7
9. Some Haitian gangs appear to be evolving into militia-like structures. For
example, the 5 Segond gang
8
is shifting its image from a traditional gangster profile
to a paramilitary organization.
9
Indeed, its leader recently announced the creation of
a special unit called “Unité Vilaj de Dieu”. In addition to adopting more formal
military attire and insignia, there is also online evidence that some gang members are
brandishing FN FAL rifles,
10
weapons that have seldom been seen or seized in Haiti.
11
10. Multiple political and gang leaders have lobbied privately and publicly for gang
members to be granted amnesty by the incoming government. Specifically, the former
leader of the 2004 Haitian coup, who was convicted in the United States for
conspiracy to launder drug money, claimed that he would seek amnesty for gang
leaders should he eventually assume power.
12
In recent months, several politicians
have floated a proposal that former government officials and gang members should
be offered immunity for past crimes, including corruption.
II. Dynamics of criminal activities
Regional dynamics of the flows of illicit arms and ammunition
11. As noted in the previous reports, there are at least three major firearm trafficking
routes into Haiti (see figures III and IV). The northern route involves the flow of
firearms from the United States to Port-au-Prince, Port-de-Paix and Cap-Haïtien. The
southern route features firearms trafficked across Haiti’s southern coast via the
__________________
5
Key informant K2, 11 June 2024.
6
Both the former head of security for the late President and the leader of the Baz Pilate gang spent
two months in Village de Dieu and later may have escaped from Haiti by boat. Their whereabouts
are unknown. Key informant K8 on 18 June 2024.
7
Key informant K8, on 5 June 2024.
8
Supported by other G-Pèp members, such as Grand Ravine, 400 Mawozo and Projet la Saline.
9
Christian Triebert, Maria Abi-Habib and John Ismay, “How a Haitian gang is trying to turn itself
into a militia”, The New York Times, 21 May 2024.
10
The FN FAL is a light automatic weapon previously manufactured in Belgium that is no longer
produced.
11
See Robert Muggah, “Securing Haiti’s transition: reviewing human insecurity and the prospects
for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration”, Occasional Paper No. 14, Small Arms
Survey, 2005.
12
See Maria Abi-Habib, Natalie Kitroeff and Frances Robles, “Why everything changed in Haiti:
the gangs united”, The New York Times, 14 March 2024.
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Caribbean and South America, including Colombia and Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of). The eastern route involves arms and munitions transiting across the land
borders between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
Figure III
Dynamics related to trafficking in firearms and ammunition from Florida,
United States
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7/25 24-13054
Figure IV
Regional dynamics related to the flow of trafficking in firearms and ammunition
12. Historically, most firearms used by Haitian criminal groups were either sourced
from the United States or stolen and diverted from the Haitian National Police, the
Haitian Armed Forces or from private security companies and civilians.
13
While the
legal United States market remains the leading source of firearms and ammunition
entering Haiti, there are also some indications of new weaponry surfacing, potentially
sourced from other countries, including Brazil and Colombia.
__________________
13
According to key informant K6 on 11 June 2024, private security firms must authorize arms
acquisition with the Haitian National Police. They are permitted 12-gauge shotguns and
handguns only. Owing to the United States firearms embargo, some companies are resorting to
other markets to source firearms and ammunition. In the case of legally sourced weapons from
the United States, purchasers are required to sign end-user certificates. There are indications that
some high-level political and economic figures are sourcing higher calibre weapons separately on
black markets. See also UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”.
S/2024/554
24-13054 8/25
13. Recently reports have emerged of a shipment from Port Everglades in Fort
Lauderdale, United States, to Cap-Haïtien. In April 2024, the Haitian National Police
intercepted boxes containing at least 26 illegal handguns and assault rifles and
hundreds of rounds of ammunition concealed in a 45-foot cargo container (see
figure V).
14
The shipment was coordinated by Alliance International Shipping
15
and
transported on a King Ocean Services cargo vessel.
16
The transaction was purportedly
destined for gangs in Artibonite Valley. The suspected individuals involved in the
shipment (a trafficker in the United States, the designated recipient in Haiti and a
customs broker) are all still at large.
17
Figure V
Firearms, ammunition and other illicit products seized on 5 April 2024 in Cap-Haïtien
Source: Official Facebook page of the Haitian National Police.
14. Despite intensified measures by the authorities in the United States to prevent
trafficking in firearms and ammunition,
18
there are significant operational challenges.
A key obstacle is the limited oversight over shipping logistics. Containers are leased
__________________
14
The weapons shipment intercepted on 5 April 2024 included 12 automatic rifles, 14 pistols and
999 cartridges, including products made in the United States by Palmetto, Taurus and Smith and
Wesson (see annex I). Other seizures reported in Cap-Haïtien involved 279 9 mm bullets
(25 October 2023), 75 12 gauge shells and 100 9 mm bullets (23 November 2023), 92 9 mm,
78 5.5 mm, and 9 0.45 calibre bullets (22 December 2023), 2 pistols and 13 9 mm magazines
(29 April 2024) and 10 9 mm magazines, 100 9 mm rounds, 50 0.38 calibre bullets and 7 12
gauge shells (11 June 2024).
15
Alliance International Shipping has been implicated in previous weapons seizures, including in
July 2022.
16
According to the customs authorities and the Brigade de Lutte contre le Trafic de Stupéfiants, the
incident occurred in Cap Terminal I, the boat name was Rainer D and the container number was
KSOU-451487-6.
17
Key informant K1 on 28 May 2024.
18
According to the United States Customs and Border Protection agency, it has stepped up its
enforcement posture on exports and has devised operations aimed at intercepting weapons and
arms headed to the island of Hispaniola. These operations include additional targeting and
examination of exports, thus curbing smuggling efforts. Their presence is more obvious at the
Port of Miami, at freight forwarders and at Miami International Airport. In addition, during 2024
outbound inspections conducted by the agency on passengers going to the island of Hispaniola
have yielded numerous interceptions of large quantities of undeclared currency and arrests and
investigations are in process. Key informants K3, 3 June 2024, and K1, 10 April 2024.
S/2024/554
9/25 24-13054
and the company’s role is limited to arranging shipments and does not extend to
tracking content.
15. There is growing awareness of the dynamics of trafficking in firearms from the
United States to Haiti. Ongoing criminal proceedings involving the former head of
the 400 Mawazo gang in the United States are instructive. The proceedings alleged
that kidnapping proceeds were used to purchase 24 firearms, including AR-15, M4
and military-grade 0.50 calibre sniper rifles in Miami, Orlando and Pompano Beach
in the United States. The orders were made by the former leader from inside a prison
in Haiti’s capital (see S/2024/320). An official of the United States Homeland
Security Investigations agency described a “marked uptick” in the volume and calibre
of firearms trafficked to Haiti since 2023.
16. Traffickers have used the so-called break-bulk port in the Miami River.
19
Rather
than sending products in containers, consignments are divided into smaller parcels to
send staples such as rice, beans and other supplies to family and friends.
20
A loophole
allows cargo with handwritten manifests valued at less than $2,500 to avoid
inspection, making them ideal for concealing contraband. Firearms, ammunition and
parts and components are hidden in consumer products and the hulls of freighters.
Cargo sent from these ports is exceedingly difficult to search even if there is
intelligence on suspected illicit consignments.
17. Another trafficking route is to the south of Haiti from places such as Colombia
and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). Reports have circulated on social media of
5 Segond gang members using FN FAL and AK-47 rifles. Key informants report that
some gang members are involved in drug trafficking activities with Spanish-speaking
“foreigners”. Indeed, at least one Colombian drug cartel has used Haiti as a trans-
shipment point to the United States and Europe and could potentially be supplying
firearms and ammunition to Haitian gang members. These transactions are likely
conducted with support from prominent Haitian politicians and business operators
under sanctions by the United States, Canada and the Dominican Republic.
18. In April 2024, the President of Colombia disclosed that a significant cache of
firearms, grenades, mortar rounds and over a million rounds of various types of
ammunition had disappeared from military warehouses in Tolemaida and La Guajira
in Colombia.
21
He suggested that some of these were being sold to organized criminal
groups, including cartels, and could be redirected to Haitian gangs. While plausible,
there is no publicly available evidence to back up these claims.
19. Even so, there are longstanding drug trafficking linkages between Haiti and
Colombia,
22
including the alleged involvement of the previously mentioned former
head of security for the late President, Mr. Moïse.
23
As previously mentioned, he was
a prime suspect in one of the largest drug cases ever pursued by the United States
__________________
19
According to key informant K1 on 7 April 2024, there are two categories of shipments from the
Miami River. The first includes container vessels using the National Port Authority, Port Lafito and
Miragoâne as ports of call. The second involves bulk carriers, or so-called “vrac” (vraquier) vessels,
that are smaller and transport goods to Gonaives, Saint-Marc and other smaller ports of call.
20
The delivery of non-bulk cargo is often used as an economical way to send goods to Haiti. Cargo
is dropped off by box trucks, pick-ups and private cars and is more difficult for customs officials
to inspect.
21
See “Arms traffickers in Colombia could supply Haitian gangs”, Haiti Libre, 3 May 2024.
22
See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets” for more on the historical relationship between
Colombian and Haitian drug cartels that extends back to the 1980s and 1990s.
23
In an interview on 7 June 2024, key informant K4 alleged that the former head of security for the
late President, Mr. Moises, introduced the Clan del Golfo criminal group from Colombia to Haiti.
He is known to have travelled to Colombia in 2021. In an interview on 8 February 2024, key
informant K7 shared suspicions that Clan del Golfo was the likeliest group to maintain drug-
related connections with Haiti and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
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Drug Enforcement Administration in Haiti. The incident occurred in 2015 when the
MV Manzanares cargo ship docked in Port-au-Prince with over 1,000 kg of cocaine
and heroin concealed in a consignment.
20. The eastern firearms trafficking route continues to pose a risk for trafficking in
firearms and ammunition. Several consignments of ammunition were intercepted in
the Dominican Republic in recent months, with 1,480 0.38 calibre and 3,000 9 mm
capsules seized in La Haina Port in the Dominican Republic.
24
A separate shipment
from Florida was intercepted in Puerto Plata,
25
which included 5,000 9 mm rounds
for filling 9 mm capsules, 1,000 bullets for filling 9 mm expandable capsules,
5 magazines for PMAG 30 5.56 rifles, and 1 barrel for a 300 Blackout rifle.
21. The Dominican Republic has taken several steps to disrupt trafficking in
firearms and ammunition across the border with Haiti, as well as through its ports and
airports.
26
The increase in reported seizures of weapons and ammunition in recent
months highlights the commitment of the customs authorities.
27
Official data made
available by national customs authorities indicate that there have been no registered
seizures at the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti since July 2023.
22. Given the existing stock of firearms already trafficked to Haitian gangs, it is
conceivable that demand may be shifting towards ensuring a more predictable and
steady supply of ammunition. Official statistics of illegal firearms intercepted by
Haitian authorities could suggest a gradually declining trend. According to official
reports generated by the Haitian National Police, 401 firearms of various calibres
were reportedly seized in 2021, 342 were seized in 2022, 265 were seized in 2023 and
96 have been seized thus far in 2024. The most seized firearms include pistols, making
up 55 per cent of all seizures in 2021, 56 per cent in 2022, 52 per cent in 2023 and 50
per cent in the first half of 2024 (see annex II). It is not yet possible to determine if
these downward trends are a consequence of changes in the scale of firearms
trafficking or a matter of declining capacities of authorities to intercept them.
23. Haitian police and customs authorities have struggled to stem the flow of
firearms and ammunition into the country, particularly at seaports, airports and border
crossings. The United Nations and others have reported multiple instances of some
Haitian public and private seaports being actively used for the transfer of firearms
and munitions.
28
These challenges are compounded by an understaffed and
underequipped maritime law enforcement capacity. There are also concerns about the
integrity and capabilities of certain Haitian public security leaders. In this regard, the
Director of the Haitian National Police was removed from office on 15 June 2024.
24. Meanwhile, there is growing pressure on United States legislators to take more
action to stem the flow of firearms and ammunition to Haiti and reduce the forced
deportation of Haitian migrants. Several members of the United States Congress have
met with human rights organizations to extend the temporary protection status for
Haitians, end deportations and advocate for stronger controls at ports in Florida.
These interactions may have generated results. For example, in March 2024 United
__________________
24
Interview on 10 June 2024.
25
Interview on 12 June 2024.
26
From June 2023 to 14 June 2024, the General Directorate of Customs has seized: 2,887,093
pieces of ammunition, 173 firearms, 386 sporting firearms, and currency amounting to DOP
1,698,237.77.
27
Since May 2021, the customs “risk engine” tool has improved control efficiency and accuracy.
Coordinated efforts with the United States Homeland Security Investigations agency since 2021 led
to 41 controlled deliveries of firearms, resulting in 67 arrests. Expansions of the UNODC Container
Control Programme in Puerto Plata and Dajabón in the Dominican Republic and new X-ray machines
have enhanced operations and interdictions, with significant advancements made in 2022, 2023 and
2024 (information received from the General Customs Administration on 17 June 2024.
28
See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”.
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States lawmakers introduced the Caribbean Arms Trafficking Causes Harm (CATCH)
Act, which seeks to curb the flow of illegal firearms, including to Haiti.
29
25. The United States authorities have also taken concrete steps to disrupt
trafficking in arms and ammunition. In 2022, the United States Congress increased
penalties for straw purchases and firearms trafficking linked to the Bipartisan Safer
Communities Act. In July 2023, the United States Department of Justice appointed a
coordinator for Caribbean firearm prosecutions and in February 2024, the Haiti
Transnational Investigative Unit was established to assist the exchange of information
between law enforcement partners in the two countries.
30
Armed groups and their links to regional criminal economies
26. The connections between Haiti’s more prominent gangs and transnational
organized criminal groups are diverse and overlapping (see figure VI).
31
The
trafficking in drugs, firearms, migrants and even eels is facilitated by Haiti’s strategic
proximity to North American and European markets. It is also exacerbated by weak
border and criminal justice capacities, protracted political instability, systemic
corruption and severe economic challenges, making it an attractive hub for trans-
shipment and various illicit activities.
Figure VI
Diverse transnational organized criminal activities involving Haiti
Source: UNODC.
__________________
29
See https://cherfilus-mccormick.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cherfilus-mccormick.house.gov/
files/evo-media-document/CATCH%20Act%20Text.pdf.
30
See United States Immigration and Customs, “Homeland Security Investigations and Haiti
Ministry of Justice establish a transnational criminal investigative unit”, 14 February 2024,
available at https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/homeland-security-investigations-and-haiti-
ministry-justice-establish-transnational.
31
See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”.
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27. Aside from a modest artisanal industry producing simple weapons, Haiti has no
domestic firearms manufacturing capacity.
32
As a result, Haitian criminal groups, as
well as private security firms and private individuals, require hard currency to source
weapons and munitions. Multi-jurisdictional smuggling networks have evolved to
meet the demand for weapons by organized criminal groups.
28. The price of firearms and ammunition depends on the calibre and quality, and
whether they are legal or illegal. Firearms that are licensed are typically more
expensive than illegal firearms, owing to the paperwork and associated transaction
costs (see table 1). The current average street price of licensed handguns in Haiti can
reach as high as $3,000, while an unlicensed handgun costs closer to $1,500. A
legalized shotgun can be valued at around $800 to $1,000, compared with $400 to
$500 for illegal firearms. The price for semi-automatic and automatic rifles, which
are virtually all illegal, varies from $5,000 to $10,000. The price of ammunition also
varies: 0.45 calibre ammunition runs $2.50 per round, 9 mm ammunition runs $3 per
round, and 5.56 mm ammunition runs roughly $7.5 per cartridge and 7.62 ammunition
runs around $10 per bullet.
33
Table 1
Estimated values of legal and illegal firearms for civilians in Haiti
Approximate legal value
(United States dollars)
Approximate illegal value
(United States dollars)
Handgun 1 500 3 000
Shotgun 800–1 000 400–500
Semi-automatic and automatic rifles n/a 5 000–10 000
0.45 and 9 mm n/a 2.5–3
5.56 and 7.62 mm n/a 7.5–10
Note: Prices may vary according to the calibre, quality, location and other factors. Approximate
prices based on interview with key informant K6 on 11 June 2024 and in partnership with the
Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.
29. Members of Haiti’s diaspora have links to both local and international organized
criminal groups. The ability of Haitian gangs and criminal networks to leverage
Haitian nationals residing abroad plays a pivotal role in sourcing illegal products and
sustaining the functioning of the cross-border trafficking system. The significant
volume of these small-scale remittance flows and financial transactions means that
illicit financial flows are likewise easily concealed among otherwise legitimate
transactions.
30. Haitian gangs such as G9, 5 Segond, Grand Ravine, Baz Galil and 400 Mawozo
oversee partnerships with international criminal networks, which in turn facilitate
trafficking in firearms and drugs and people smuggling. There are suspicions that
Haitian criminal groups have links to groups in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of).
34
National diversion of arms
31. Other State and non-State armed groups could potentially be sources of diverted
firearms and ammunition. The Protected Areas Security Brigade of the Haitian
__________________
32
See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”.
33
Information collected in cooperation with the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized
Crime.
34
Interview with key informant K7, 8 February 2024.
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National Protected Areas Agency is responsible for environmental monitoring of
protected areas in Haiti.
35
The Brigade reportedly includes 6,000–15,000 armed
personnel, though local experts suggest the number may be closer to 1,500.
36
However, the Brigade may be expanding: during the last quarter of 2023, 484 new
recruits reportedly graduated in Jacmel.
32. Since late November 2023, the leaders of the Protected Areas Security Brigade
have declared alliance with political figures and pledged support for the revolution
against the administration of the former Prime Minister, Ariel Henry. The former
Prime Minister ordered the removal of all Brigade officers in a bid to crack down on
their operations. In late 2023 and early 2024, elements of the Brigade violently
clashed with the Haitian National Police. Local media reports also documented
suspected Brigade involvement in criminal activities. Even so, the Brigade has latent
support from the local Haitian population in the vicinity.
33. The Haitian Armed Forces, disbanded in 1995 and restored in 2017, had been
reconstituted into an infantry battalion of roughly 700 active personnel by 2023.
Engineering support was received from Ecuador and Mexico, military equipment
from Taiwan, Province of China, and training from Argentina. Brazil, France and
several African nations have reportedly offered support. While serving as a
“gendarmerie” and operating in selected areas, the Haitian Armed Forces are not
authorized to conduct stand-alone operations and information concerning the extent
of their holdings of weapons and ammunition is not publicly available.
34. There are hundreds of private security companies in Haiti, some of which
facilitate firearm permits for civilians or provide weapons clandestinely.
37
The
deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission will likely be accompanied
by a wide range of private security vendors, trainers and personnel that will provide
services to the Mission. While there is limited publicly available information on the
precise number and ownership structure of private security companies in Haiti, there
have been sightings of higher calibre firearms being held by private guards on the
street. Under Haitian law, private security firms can equip only half of their listed
personnel with shotguns and handguns.
38
35. Owing to the uneven provision of public security, Haitian communities have a
long tradition of establishing neighbourhood protection groups. Over the past year,
such groups have been set up in Canapé Vert, Morne Brun and Montagne Noire and
in several parts of the Delmas district. These groups are constituted of residents,
including former and current police officers. While such groups have yet to graduate
to full-fledged militia, they can assume similar characteristics. Many request a
so-called tax to provide protection and have gradually militarized in response to
gangs.
Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants
36. The average numbers of arrivals to and departures from Haiti have declined
overall since the start of 2024. In January 2024, there were reportedly over 46,000
travellers of varying nationalities departing Haiti.
39
The prison break and attack on the
international airport in March 2024 contributed to a decline of more than 80 per cent in
air travel to just over 7,600 travellers in March 2024. While the number of documented
travellers to Haiti increased again in April and May 2024, it is still well below the
__________________
35
The Protected Areas Security Brigade’s mission is also to provide support to border control authorities.
36
Interview with key informant K8, 10 January 2024.
37
See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”.
38
Ibid.
39
Information received from the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) of the
Caribbean Community, 2024.
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previous average. The imposition of border restrictions by several countries and chronic
political and social instability in Haiti could trigger increased illegal border crossings.
37. The current security situation has affected migration and trafficking dynamics.
Specifically, the temporary disruption to the international airport and seaports in March
2024 stymied the movement of both licit and illicit goods. Border control measures
imposed by the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and the United States have
contributed to reduced cross-border flows.
40
This has likely also incentivized
smuggling services, including in transportation, accommodation, food and escort
support, for irregular border crossings, including corruption at border points. The
services of smugglers are procured online or through personal connections.
38. There are multiple reports of Haitians seeking to enter countries in Latin American
and Caribbean since May 2024. Information collected by UNODC indicated that nine
Latin American and Caribbean countries have initiated criminal investigations
involving Haitians as smuggled migrants or as smugglers.
41
In their attempt to reach
Canada and the United States irregularly, Haitian nationals often enter Nicaragua
without a visa
42
or travel through Brazil, Colombia and Panama (through the Darien
Gap). From January to May 2024, some 9,872 Haitians were detected crossing the
Panama-Colombia border irregularly. Haitians may pay smugglers, on average, $250
to cross into the Dominican Republic, or even as much as $10,000 for such services,
despite an average annual salary of roughly $1,200–$1,500.
39. Haitians have continued to travel directly to the United States via the Dominican
Republic and neighbouring Caribbean countries. United States authorities have
detected an increase in the smuggling of Haitian migrants by sea via the Mona Passage
and the Bahamas in recent months.
43
Haitians are also reportedly departing from
northern Haiti directly to the Bahamas and neighbouring Turks and Caicos islands.
Meanwhile, the United States Customs and Border Protection agency reported
144,994 encounters with Haitians in the first seven months of 2024 (compared with
approximately 163,781 in 2023 and 56,596 in 2022).
44
40. A disturbing trend is the escalated risk of child exploitation in Haiti, particularly
due to chronic instability, widespread school closures, diminished economic
opportunities and rising food prices. The United Nations has identified a heightened
risk of children being exploited for the purpose of domestic servitude, a practice
known as restavek (Creole for “stay with”). The well-documented practice involves
traffickers taking advantage of lower-income households by arranging for placement
of their children with wealthier families, who exploit them in domestic servitude.
Although restavek was widely reported prior to 2024, with an estimated 1 in 15
children believed to be affected,
45
the dire conditions have generated heightened
vulnerabilities.
__________________
40
See “Bahamas takes steps to protect borders as Haitian crisis deepens”, Loop News, 18 March
2024; “Jamaica wants to avoid ‘an avalanche’ of Haitians and will only take in a few refugees”,
Dominican Today, 9 March 2024; and United States, Department of Homeland Security,
“Presidential proclamation to suspend and limit entry and joint DHS-DOJ interim final rule to
restrict asylum during high encounters at the southern border”, June 2024.
41
UNODC conducted a survey among prosecutors in Latin America and the Caribbean in May
2024 on open investigations related to trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Six
ongoing cases of smuggling of migrants involving Haitians were reported.
42
Haitians may be sent an “invitation letter” and “travel authorization” to fly to Nicaragua and then
onward to the Guatemala-Mexico border and eventually to the Mexico-United States border.
43
According to IMPACS (2024), 22 Haitian nationals were intercepted in Jamaica having illegally
entered by sea.
44
See United States Customs and Border Protection Encounters platform (https://www.cbp.gov/news
room/stats/nationwide-encounters).
45
See https://restavekfreedom.org/issue/.
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41. Relatedly, there are widely reported concerns of vulnerable children being
recruited by gangs and criminal groups
46
for illegal activities, including with regard
to violence and sexual exploitation. There are an estimated 180,000 internally
displaced children in Haiti, and OHCHR estimates that between 30 and 50 per cent
of gang members are minors, who are often coerced into joining gangs because they
fear reprisals for their family or themselves (see A/HRC/54/79). With an estimated
200 gangs and some 15,000 gang members operating nationally, there could be as
many as 7,500 children involved in these armed gangs.
III. Reviewing illicit financial flows
42. The high level of volatility and breakdown of Haitian institutions hinders a
detailed assessment of the scale and dynamics of illicit financial flows. This is not a
novel challenge: Haiti has registered a rising risk index score for money-laundering
and terrorist financing over the past decade. In 2023, the country reported a score of
8.25, the highest in the world.
47
Haiti has likewise failed to meet several targets set
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to address strategic deficiencies.
43. Notwithstanding the absence of fully functioning institutions, it is still possible
to track illicit financial flows by focusing on payment streams via proxy indicators,
including remittances and transfers. The World Bank, for example, estimates that
there was a 57 per cent increase in personal transfers received in Haiti between 2017
and 2022, from $2.4 to $3.8 billion (see table 2). There was also a 144 per cent
increase in remittances paid, from $309 million in 2017 to $725 million in 2022 (ibid).
While most of these flows were likely directed towards purchasing basic goods and
services in the formal and informal economies, they are also likely to include
increased illicit financial transactions involving criminal groups.
Table 2
Reported remittances to Haiti from the United States, 2017–2022
(United States dollars)
Personal remittances received Personal remittances paid
2017 2 419 165 423.81 297 710 340.43
2018 2 735 177 966.71 309 403 439.14
2019 2 695 149 513.66 284 975 298.61
2020 3 257 277 839.54 549 483 207.17
2021 3 994 393 882.97 678 498 745.92
2022 3 797 752 749.15 725 386 292.38
Source: World Bank world development indicators, 2024, available at https://databank.worldbank.org/
source/world-development-indicators.
__________________
46
Gangs and criminal groups, while often referred to interchangeably, have distinct characteristics.
Gangs typically have a strong social identity, with members sharing common cultural or
neighbourhood backgrounds and adhering to a defined hierarchy and codes of conduct. They are
often territorial, engaging in activities ranging from petty crime to serious offences in order to
assert dominance or protect their turf. In contrast, criminal groups primarily focus on illegal
activities for profit, with varying structures from loosely organized networks to sophisticated
organizations. They are less concerned with territorial control, operating more secretly and often
internationally, engaging in high-level crimes such as drug trafficking, money-laundering and
cybercrime. Both pose significant challenges to law enforcement but understanding their
differences helps in developing targeted intervention strategies.
47
See https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Haiti.html.
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44. Haiti’s political and economic instability are aggravated by systemic corruption
and money-laundering.
48
Laws intended to deter, disrupt and penalize corruption and
money-laundering are only partially implemented and are poorly enforced. Prior to
and during the current security crisis, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of
corruption and economic and financial crimes have been hindered by loopholes in
existing legal frameworks.
49
Key laws are still missing, including on asset recovery,
the protection of witnesses, victims, informants and whistle-blowers and ensuring
public access to information. Haitian authorities reportedly lose up to $650 million a
year due to underreporting revenue, fraudulent reporting, under qualified staff and
manipulated performance metrics at the General Customs Administration.
50
45. Nevertheless, the anti-corruption unit has led multiple national consultation
processes on draft laws regarding free access to information and whistleblower
protection. The unit has initiated the development of a legislative framework
dedicated to asset recovery.
51
Prosecutions for corruption are extremely rare, however.
Criminal justice and oversight institutions involved in anti-corruption efforts have
themselves been systematically degraded. Haiti’s routinely scores low when it comes
to perceptions of corruption and anti-money-laundering indices.
52
Measures
undertaken by the unit suggest that improvements are feasible, even in highly
turbulent settings.
53
The scaling up and consolidation of support for more
comprehensive anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering measures will be
warranted especially once institutions are fully functioning and high-level political
commitment to financial integrity can be re-established, including in partnership with
international partners such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
46. Despite incremental progress in advancing the anti-money-laundering agendas
in 2024,
54
Haiti continues to be carefully monitored by FATF and remains on its grey
list of States with strategic deficiencies with regard to anti-money-laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism.
55
In June 2021, Haiti made a high-level political
commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of its regime for anti-money-laundering
and countering terrorist financing in collaboration with FATF and the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) leading to improvements, including preventive
strategies, information-sharing with relevant foreign counterparts and measures to
address technical deficiencies in addressing money-laundering and terrorist financing
offenses. Despite Haiti’s ongoing efforts, deadlines established in its action plan have
expired.
56
__________________
48
See UNODC, “Haiti’s criminal markets”.
49
See executive summaries of the United Nations Convention against Corruption Implementation
Review Group, 19–23 June 2017 (available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1701394e.pdf) and
12−16 June 2023 (available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/
ImplementationReviewGroup/12-16June2023/CAC-COSP-IRG-II-2-1-Add.32/2305765E.pdf).
50
Information from an unpublished report by IMPACS, May 2024.
51
See https://x.com/ULCCHaiti/status/1801656989162029567/photo/1.
52
In 2023, for example, Haiti was ranked 172 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (see https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/haiti).
53
Information from an unpublished report by the anti-corruption unit concerning investigations
between March and November 2023.
54
Between 2 and 7 June 2024, senior officials from the Central Financial Intelligence Unit of Haiti
participated in the CFATF plenary in Trinidad and Tobago to explain its latest monitoring report.
The delegations reportedly praised the country’s progress despite an extremely degraded security
situation (interview with Central Financial Intelligence Unit official, 13 June 2024).
55
See https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Haiti.html.
56
See FATF, “Jurisdictions under increased monitoring, 23 February 2024, available at
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-
monitoring-february-2024.html.
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47. In 2023, investigators at the anti-corruption unit completed 11 investigative
reports into corruption and money-laundering. Of the total of 42 investigative reports
submitted to the Haitian judiciary over the past three years, three indictments were
issued by magistrates for adjudication in the criminal court.
57
In the first six months
of 2024, the Haitian Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau oversaw more than 30
cases, including five related to corruption.
58
An Anti-Corruption Circuit was
established in February 2022. On 4 June 2024, a team of investigators from the
anti-corruption unit and Haitian National Police officers conducted a search of the
National Education Fund offices. The operation followed recent allegations of
corruption and embezzlement committed between 2017 and 2024.
48. Several longer-term anti-corruption investigations are generating results. In
May 2022, the anti-corruption unit conducted a search of the General Customs
Administration. By December 2022, the anti-corruption unit had ordered the freezing
of the bank accounts of the Director of the Administration and other financial assets
due to a failure to substantiate sources of asset growth. The investigation was
concluded in March 2023 and recommended the prosecution of the former head of
the General Customs Administration and his accomplices for illicit enrichment,
money-laundering and false asset declarations.
59
The evidence unveiled a
sophisticated scheme for concealing assets, involving cash deposits in bank accounts,
undeclared real estate acquisitions and dubious commercial activities through shell
companies.
60
49. On 8 May 2024, the examining magistrate issued an order referring the former
head of the General Customs Administration, his wife and a Catholic priest who was
the former director of the international non-governmental organization Food for the
Poor in Cap-Haïtien, to the criminal court on charges of money-laundering, illicit
enrichment and false asset declarations. The judge ruled that the evidence presented
by the anti-corruption unit was sufficient for indictment. In an order made public on
14 May 2024, the examining magistrate referred the defendants to the criminal court
for trial without a jury. However, the whereabouts of the accused are unknown.
50. Many Haitians, including politically exposed persons and their family members
and associates,
61
often establish companies in southern Florida during or shortly after
they, or their business partners, assume public office or positions in important
agencies.
62
51. This behaviour, if supported by additional investigations and data, could raise
concerns about potential conflicts of interest, abuse of power and the undermining of
public trust in government institutions, highlighting the need for enhanced
transparency, accountability and regulatory oversight in both Haiti and the United
States.
52. There is also evidence of seizures of cash transactions to and from Haiti in 2024.
The increase in cash-based transactions is a way to finance criminality and to
exfiltrate the proceeds.
63
IMPACS identified cash seizures of approximately $90,000
__________________
57
Information from an unpublished report by the anti-corruption unit, 6 May 2024.
58
Information from an unpublished report by the Haitian Financial and Economic Affairs Bureau,
13 June 2024.
59
Information from an unpublished investigation report by the anti-corruption unit, March 2023.
60
Ibid.
61
According to article 52 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, politically exposed
persons are defined as “individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public
functions and their family members and close associates”.
62
See United States, Florida Division of Corporations official site, available at https://search.sunbiz.org/.
63
UNODC has developed a comprehensive approach to supporting national authorities and civil
society tackle corruption.
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destined for Haiti through selected ports. These included a transfer of over $62,000
in bulk currency in a duffle bag and checked luggage as well as $27,000 in bulk
currency concealed on an individual.
64
53. Between November 2023 and April 2024, the Central Financial Intelligence
Unit of Haiti received a total of 394,916 transaction declarations involving funds
flowing through money transfer systems and banks. Out of these, a total of just 151
suspicious transaction reports were registered. Money transfer activities appear to be
a significant source of suspicion for possible money-laundering. Banks also
contributed to suspicious transaction reports, although their involvement was less
pronounced, with just 60 declarations.
65
IV. Conclusion and recommendations
54. Haiti is likely to continue experiencing considerable instability and insecurity
in the near term. While the formation of the new Government is an important
development, a growing concern relates to the collusion and coordination of Haiti’s
dominant criminal gangs, the persistence of criminal markets and in turn the
disruption to efforts to strengthen institutions. The intersection of domestic gangs
with transnational organized criminal networks represents a threat to stability both in
Haiti and the wider region. The deployment of the Multinational Security Support
Mission is critical, as are investments in supporting authorities to develop
comprehensive, whole-of-society strategies to prevent organized crime; pursue
organized criminal groups and their illicit activities; protect the most vulnerable; and
promote partnerships and cooperation at all levels in line with the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In this regard, it is key to support
law enforcement and criminal justice institutions to investigate, seize and prosecute
cases of trafficking in firearms and drugs, trafficking in persons, human smuggling
and other crimes, both domestically and through international cooperation.
66
In this
regard, creating appropriate legislative and operational measures to ensure the
protection of witnesses and victims should be a priority.
55. Haitian authorities and international partners are urged to develop
comprehensive responses to prevent and counter cross-border and internal illicit
firearms flows and their linkages to other forms of serious crime. This includes
implementing legislative and institutional frameworks and developing standard
operating procedures for inter-agency cooperation, including at relevant border
points. Additional investments in law enforcement, border control and improved
domain awareness, including canine units and advanced detection, are essential.
56. Haitian authorities and international partners are urged to develop a robust
security sector reform diagnostic ability to assess and anticipate the security
governance needs in the country. As noted above, several State actors, including the
Haitian Armed Forces and the Protected Areas Security Brigade, are actively
engaging in the security response. Given the imminent deployment of the
Multinational Security Support Mission, a careful examination of risks and
opportunities is essential in order to shape an effective, efficient and rights-respecting
security architecture.
__________________
64
Information from an unpublished report by IMPACS, May 2024”.
65
See Central Financial Intelligence Unit of Haiti, “Les efforts d’Haïti en matière de lutte
anti-blanchiment de janvier à juin 2024”, June 2024 (unpublished report).
66
The United States approved $70 million in military aid in 2024 for the Haitian National Police
and supporting forces from the Bahamas, Kenya and Jamaica. The most recent military package
includes 80 Humvees, 35 MaxxPro infantry carriers, sniper rifles, firearms, ammunition and
surveillance drones.
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57. Another priority involves strengthening domestic legislation, technical
capacities and community violence prevention and reduction measures.
67
In addition
to enforcing legislation, additional training is recommended in relation to the
detection, investigation and prosecution of firearms-related trafficking cases.
Improvements are likewise needed in operational analysis, electronic evidence
handling and financial investigations to target criminal markets that drive trafficking
networks.
68
58. Country-specific legislation on smuggling of migrants in Haiti is urgently
needed. The identification and prosecution of smugglers can only be achieved by a
robust normative framework that criminalizes all elements of the smuggling of
migrants in accordance with article 6 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime. It cannot criminalize migrants for having been the
object of this conduct. Haiti should be supported to strengthen border controls and
enhance security and control of personal documents by fostering partnerships with
the private sector, mainly commercial carriers, to prevent the use of aircraft or sea
vessels in the commission of such crimes. International and national financial
investigations should also be used to mitigate both the smuggling of migrants and
human trafficking.
59. Haitians should be supported to undertake context-specific prevention and
awareness-raising campaigns in Creole to inform the wider public and potentially
vulnerable groups about the risk and protection factors related to trafficking in
persons, including by fostering grass-roots outreach programmes, particularly for
girls and boys. It is likewise important to promote victim-centred and gender-sensitive
criminal justice responses in trafficking in persons cases by providing trauma-
informed services to victims and empowering them to testify and by ensuring that
protection measures are available.
60. The Haitian authorities are urged strengthen the National Committee against
Trafficking in Persons and develop a renewed action plan against this crime that
addresses specific prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership measures in
line with Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.
61. Haitian authorities should consider developing a nationwide educational
programme on anti-corruption with the support of international partners. This
initiative will align with target 16.5 of the Sustainable Development Goals, which is
aimed at substantially reducing corruption and bribery in all its forms. By enhancing
education on anti-corruption and embedding such programmes in existing educational
curricula, such an initiative will contribute to building effective, accountable and
inclusive institutions.
__________________
67
In 2019, a task force was established to promote progress in Haiti’s national strategy for
disarmament, dismantlement, reintegration and community violence reduction. By 2021, the task
force had initiated work on revising firearms and ammunition legislation. In 2022, a national
action plan was adopted within the framework of the Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean
Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in
a Sustainable Manner by 2030 (data retrieved from a presentation by Haiti during the third
annual meeting of member States of the Caribbean Roadmap on Firearms, Saint Lucia,
November 2023.
68
In the longer-term, Haiti could establish an integrated firearms centre to centralize information,
improve inter-agency coordination and serve as a focal point for the national and international
exchange of information and inputs to international review mechanisms.
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62. Haiti should enhance its commitment and efforts at the highest level to
implement its FATF/CFATF action plan, especially so as to consolidate any progress
made prior to the crisis.
63. Haitian authorities and countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and North
America are urged to conduct financial investigations related to illicit trafficking to
detect money-laundering or proceeds of crime, identify who ultimately benefits from
the criminal activity and disrupt the operations of criminal networks. Enhanced
bilateral and international cooperation among Member States should be encouraged
to conduct timely criminal investigations and prosecutions against illicit trafficking
affecting Haiti.
64. Haiti should strengthen anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering measures,
adopting modern domestic legislation on corruption and related offences in line with
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, including relevant missing
legislation such as laws on asset recovery, the protection of witnesses, victims,
informants and whistle-blowers and ensuring public access to information. This
includes enhanced measures to trace, seize and confiscate Haitian proceeds of
corruption laundered and or invested in different jurisdictions outside of Haiti.
Strengthening the legal framework for international cooperation in respect to all
offences established in accordance with the Convention should also constitute a
priority for Haiti and its neighbours. Concluding agreements and providing enhanced
support for judicial officials could enhance the legal basis for international
cooperation on judicial matters, including mutual legal assistance, in all offences
established in accordance with the Convention.
65. Haiti should consider establishing a specialized jurisdiction to address
corruption and financial crime, including those involving politically exposed persons,
family members and associates. It is also critical to support the identification of
corruption risks in the General Customs Administration and develop and implement
a strategy to promote integrity and mitigate corrupt activities in customs operations.
66. Haitian authorities should consider enhancing Haiti’s asset declaration system
and developing a comprehensive beneficial ownership system. This involves
mandating detailed asset declarations from all senior officials, including those in law
enforcement and the judiciary, covering assets, interests and bank accounts held both
domestically and abroad, directly or through beneficial ownership. The monitoring
and enforcement mechanism should be strengthened so as to ensure compliance,
including stringent penalties for non-compliance and false declarations. In addition,
a publicly accessible registry of beneficial ownership should be developed to further
promote transparency and accountability.
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Annex I
Reported firearms and ammunition seized on 5 April 2024 in
Cap-Haïtien
Mark/brand Model Serial number Caliber
Assault rifles Palmetto PA-15 multi PA-138017 5.56 x 45 mm
Palmetto PA-15 multi SCB410698 5.56 x 45 mm
Palmetto PA-15 multi SCB403416 5.56 x 45 mm
Pioneer Arms Corps Random Poland PAC116985022 7.62 x 39 mm
Palmetto GF37260 AKP007260 7.62 x 39 mm
Windham ME XMI15-E2S L314915 5.56 x 45 mm
Palmetto PA-15 multi LW295710 5.56 x 45 mm
DPMS Tcloud MN A-15 DNWC034079 223 x 5.56 mm
American tactical US Patent 8789307 NS241081 5.56 x 45 mm
DB DB15 DB2154366 Multiple
Palmetto PA-15 multi SCB991897 5.56 x 45 mm
Zastava Serbia PAPM92PV M92PV026347 7.62 x 39 mm
Pistols Glock17 GEN5 BPDK228 9 mm x 19
SARSILMAZ B6 T1102-21E60325 9 mm x 19
Springfield XD-9 BB563146 9 mm x 19
CZ P-10F HD444450 9 mm x 19
Smith & Wesson SD40VE FDK5227 40 mm
LLAMA S.HAOKENSANCKNJ A28304 45 mm
Taurus PT100AFS SVF10828 40 mm
STOEGOR STR-9 T642921U17696 9 x 19 mm
Taurus PT809 TFS3045 9 x 19 mm
SIGSAUER P320M18 M18A014282 9 x 19 mm
Ruger SR9C 332-48151 9 x 19 mm
Springfield XD*-9 S3830972 9 x 19 mm
Kimber MFG KUI00799 45ACP 9 x 19 mm
RAVEN P-25 560103 25 mm
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Annex II
List of firearms seized, 2021–May 2024
Pistol Revolver Rifle Shotgun
Home-made
weapons Total
2021 January 30 2 8 1 9 50
February 27 1 8 5 – 41
March 8 2 3 1 5 19
April 23 4 2 2 8 39
May 15 5 3 1 3 27
June 3 1 2 – 6 12
July 17 1 13 7 7 45
August 25 3 2 3 4 37
September 16 6 6 – 12 40
October 18 1 3 2 2 26
November 16 – 6 4 3 29
December 24 3 3 5 1 36
Total 222 29 59 31 60 401
2022 January 19 – 4 1 1 25
February 10 2 2 1 6 21
March 26 5 2 3 5 41
April 15 5 4 3 5 32
May 29 6 7 – 6 48
June 13 1 3 – 2 19
July 30 3 23 2 1 59
August 11 – 4 2 2 19
September 4 1 5 3 4 17
October 9 2 5 – 6 22
November 16 2 6 1 1 26
December 10 1 1 1 – 13
Total 192 28 66 17 39 342
2023 January 14 1 7 1 2 25
February 16 4 3 2 – 25
March 9 4 3 – 5 21
April 20 – 10 1 – 31
May 4 1 5 1 1 12
June 4 2 5 1 4 16
July 9 2 3 1 4 19
August 13 1 1 – 1 16
September 13 2 4 1 1 21
October 18 3 2 3 5 31
November 10 4 1 – 2 17
December 10 1 6 1 13 31
Total 140 25 50 12 38 265
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Pistol Revolver Rifle Shotgun
Home-made
weapons Total
2024 January 5 1 1 2 1 10
February 7 1 6 4 3 21
March 7 1 6 – 3 17
April 22 – 13 – – 35
May 7 3 2 – 1 13
Total 48 6 28 6 8 96
Source: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and United Nations police.
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Annex III
Drugs seized in Haiti, 2022 to May2024
(Kilograms)
Marijuana Cocaine Heroine Other Total
2021 January 12.566 0.792 – – 13.358
February 0.943 3.247 – – 4.190
March 33.544 – – – 33.544
April 12.5035 – – – 12.5035
May 2 108.719 – – – 2 108.719
June – – – – –
July – – – – –
August – – – – –
September 68.208 2.15 – – 70.358
October 836.810 4.333 – – 841.143
November 3.38 6.86 – – 10.24
December 1.687 15.07 – – 16.757
Total 3 078.3605 32.452 – – 3 110.8125
2022 January 10.855 2.386 – – 13.241
February 2.33 1.1 – – 3.43
March 4.484 – – – 4.484
April – – – – –
May 352.075 – – – 352.075
June 11.725 9.05 – – 20.775
July 354.421 15.266 – – 369.687
August 1 040.713 3.816 – – 1 044.529
September 24.435 1.429 – – 25.864
October 27.276 1.2 – – 28.476
November – – – – –
December 241.8 0.852 – – 242.652
Total 2 070.117 35.0994 – – 2 105.2164
2023 January 32.671 0.259 – – 32.93
February 12.727 5 – – 17.727
March 4.309 – – – 4.309
April 22.835 – – – 22.835
May 27.6705 0.2017 – – 27.8722
June 4.5 – – – 4.5
July 19.01 2.37 – – 21.38
August 6.89 3.2 – – 10.09
September 29.53 – – – 29.53
October 8.89 1.19 – – 10.08
November 33.4 – – – 33.4
December 20.66 – – – 20.66
Total 223.0925 12.2207 – – 235.3132
S/2024/554
25/25 24-13054
Marijuana Cocaine Heroine Other Total
2024 January 1.340 – – – 1.340
February 195.76 0.05 – – 195.81
March – – – – –
April 0.08 – – – 0.08
May 4.449 0.0096 – – 4.4586
Total 201.629 0.0596 – – 201.6886
Source: United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and United Nations police.